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National Security Strategy 2000

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is the cornerstone of international nuclear nonproliferation efforts and reinforces regional and global security by creating confidence in the non-nuclear commitments of its parties. It was an indispensable precondition for the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and South Africa. We seek to ensure that the NPT remains a strong and vital element of global security by achieving universal adherence and full compliance by its parties with their Treaty obligations. Achieving a successful Review Conference in 2000 will be important to the future of this critical Treaty. We will vigorously promote the value of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while continuing policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and to work for their ultimate elimination.
To reinforce the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, we seek to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and achieve a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Halting production of fissile materials for nuclear explosions would cap the supply of nuclear materials available worldwide for weapons, a key step in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. A coordinated effort by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent and deter illegal trafficking in fissile materials, and the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, which enhances security for nuclear materials having potential terrorist applications, are also essential to our counter-proliferation efforts.
Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and other initiatives, we aim to strengthen controls over weapons-usable fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of WMD and related material and technology from the former Soviet Union. The CTR Program has effectively supported enhanced safety, security, accounting and centralized control measures for nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. It has assisted Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapons states and will continue to assist Russia in meeting its START obligations. The CTR Program is also supporting measures to eliminate and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological weapon-related capabilities, and has supported many ongoing military reductions and reform measures in the former Soviet Union. We are working to strengthen the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to increase accountability and protection, which complements our effort to enhance IAEA safeguards.
In 1999, the President launched the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This effort is designed to address the new security challenges in Russia and the other Newly Independent States (NIS) caused by the financial crisis, including preventing WMD proliferation, reducing the threat posed by residual WMD, and stabilizing the military. This initiative builds on the success of existing programs, such as the CTR program, the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program and the Science Centers, to make additional progress in the more challenging environment now facing Russia and the NIS. ETRI initiatives will substantially expand our cooperative efforts to eliminate WMD in the NIS and prevent their proliferation abroad. A new component of our nuclear security program will greatly increase the security of fissile material by concentrating it at fewer, well-protected sites, and new programs will increase the security of facilities and experts formerly associated with the Soviet Union’s biological weapons effort.
At the Cologne summit in June 1999, the leaders of the G-8 nations affirmed their intention to establish arrangements to protect and safely manage weapons-grade fissile material no longer required for defense purposes, especially plutonium. They expressed strong support for initiatives being undertaken by G-8 countries and others for scientific and technical cooperation necessary to support future large-scale disposition programs, invited all interested countries to support projects for early implementation of such programs, and urged establishment of a joint strategy for cooperation in large-scale disposition projects. They also recognized that an international approach to financing will be required – involving both public and private funds – and agreed to review potential increases in their resource commitments prior to the next G-8 Summit in July 2000.
We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel, and working with Russia to remove 34 metric tons of plutonium from each country’s nuclear weapons programs and converting it so that it can never be used in nuclear weapons. We are redirecting dozens of former Soviet WMD facilities and tens of thousands of former Soviet WMD scientists in Eastern Europe and Eurasia from military activities to beneficial civilian research. These efforts include implementing a new biotechnical initiative aimed at increasing transparency in former Soviet biological weapons facilities and redirecting their scientists to civilian commercial, agricultural, and public health activities.
In support of U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of WMD by organized crime groups and individuals in the NIS and Eastern Europe, the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and the FBI are engaging in programs that assist governments in developing effective export control systems and capabilities to prevent, deter, or detect proliferation of WMD and weapons materials across borders. These programs provide training, equipment, advice, and services to law enforcement and border security agencies in these countries.
We seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with a new international regime to ensure compliance. We are negotiating with other BWC member states in an effort to reach consensus on a protocol to the BWC that would implement an inspection system to enhance compliance and promote transparency. We are also working hard to implement and enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States Congress underscored the importance of these efforts in October 1998 by passing implementing legislation that makes it possible for the United States to comply with the requirements in the CWC for commercial declarations and inspections.
The Administration also seeks to prevent destabilizing buildups of conventional arms and limit access to sensitive technical information, equipment and technologies by strengthening international regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group (for chemical and biological weapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and the Zangger Committee (which ensures that IAEA safeguards are applied to nuclear exports). At the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO’s ability to deal both politically and militarily with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.
Regional nonproliferation efforts are particularly important in three critical proliferation zones. On the Korean Peninsula, we are implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, which requires full compliance by North Korea with its nonproliferation obligations. We also seek to convince North Korea to halt its indigenous missile program and exports of missile systems and technologies. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we encourage regional confidence

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