National Security Strategy 2001

 

Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program and other initiatives, we aim to strengthen controls over weapons-usable fissile material and prevent the theft or diversion of NBC weapons and related material and technology from the former Soviet Union. The CTR Program has effectively supported enhanced safety, security, accounting, and centralized control measures for nuclear weapons and fissile materials in the former Soviet Union. It has assisted Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus in becoming non-nuclear weapons states and will continue to assist Russia in meeting its START obligations. The CTR Program is also supporting measures to eliminate and prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons and biological weapon-related capabilities, and it has supported many ongoing military reductions and reform measures in the former Soviet Union.
The Nonproliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) is a sharply focused fund to permit rapid response to unanticipated, high priority requirements or opportunities to: 1) halt the spread of WMD, their delivery systems, and related technology; 2) limit the spread of advanced conventional weapons and related technology; and 3) eliminate existing weapons. NDF activities in Central Europe and the NIS have included the elimination of SCUD and SS-23 missiles, the procurement of HEU, the development and deployment of automated systems to license and track sensitive technologies, and the acquisition of nuclear material detection equipment.
In 1999, the President launched the Expanded Threat Reduction Initiative (ETRI). This effort is designed to address the new security challenges in Russia and the other Newly Independent States (NIS) caused by that year’s financial crisis, including preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons, reducing the threat posed by residual NBC weapons, and stabilizing the military. This initiative builds on the success of existing programs, such as the CTR program, the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, and the Science Centers. A new component of our nuclear security program will greatly enhance the security of fissile material by concentrating it at fewer, well-protected sites, and new programs will increase the security of facilities and experts formerly associated with the Soviet Union’s biological weapons effort.
At the June 4, 2000, Clinton-Putin summit, the United States and Russia reached agreement on the management and disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes. The agreement entered into force after Prime Minister Kasyanov and Vice President Gore signed it on September 1, 2000. Under the agreement, each government commits to irreversibly transform 34 metric tons of excess weapon-grade plutonium to a form that will be unusable for weapons. The agreement establishes the goals, timelines, and conditions for ensuring that this plutonium can never again be used for weapons or any other military purposes.
Implementation of the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement is contingent on sufficient international assistance for the Russian program. At the Okinawa G-8 Summit in July 2000, leaders took an additional step to this end. The final communiqué stated that their goal for the next summit is to develop an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on a detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to coordinate this cooperation. They also committed to expand cooperation to other interested countries beyond the G-8 in order to gain the widest possible international support, and to explore the potential for both public and private funding.
Over the past year, the United States Government provided leadership for the multilateral cooperation effort, particularly in the context of an informal G-8 working group, which coordinated with the G-8 Nonproliferation Experts Group. (NPEG). Preparations for the Genoa summit will be under the auspices of a formally established Plutonium Disposition Planning Group to be co-chaired by the United States and the Russian Federation. We are purchasing tons of highly enriched uranium from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons for conversion into commercial reactor fuel. We are helping redirect dozens of former Soviet NBC facilities and tens of thousands of former NBC scientists in Eurasia from military activities to beneficial civilian research.
In support of U.S. efforts to prevent proliferation of NBC expertise and materials in the NIS, Eastern Europe, and across borders, the Departments of Defense, Energy, and Commerce, the U.S. Customs Service, and the FBI are engaging in programs that assist governments in developing effective export control systems and in developing capabilities to prevent, deter, or detect such proliferation. These programs provide training, equipment, advice, and services to law enforcement and border security agencies in these countries.
We seek to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) with a new international regime to enhance compliance. We are also working hard to implement and enforce the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States Congress underscored the importance of these efforts in October 1998 by passing implementing legislation. In late 1999, the Executive Order (EO 13128), Presidential Decision Directive (PDD-70), and two new regulations were completed, enabling the United States to submit commercial declarations and commence commercial facility inspections in the middle of 2000.
The Administration also seeks to prevent destabilizing buildups of conventional arms and to limit access to sensitive technical information, equipment, and technologies by strengthening international regimes, including the Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies, the Australia Group (for chemical and biological weapons), the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), and the Zangger Committee (NSG and Zangger ensure that IAEA safeguards are applied to nuclear exports). At the NATO 50th Anniversary Summit, Allied leaders agreed to enhance NATO’s ability to deal both politically and militarily with the proliferation of WMD and the means of their delivery. To this end, we have worked with our Alliance partners to establish the NATO WMD Center and to promote invigorated discussions of nonproliferation issues in the NATO Senior Political Military and Defense Groups on Proliferation.
Regional nonproliferation efforts are particularly important in three critical proliferation zones: the Korean Peninsula, Southwest Asia, and South Asia. On the Korean Peninsula, we are implementing the 1994 Agreed Framework, which requires full compliance by North Korea to live up to its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. We also seek to convince North Korea to halt its indigenous missile program and exports of missile systems and technologies; something emphasized during a November 2000 visit to Pyongyang by the Secretary of State. In the Middle East and Southwest Asia, we encourage regional confidence-building measures and arms control agreements that address the legitimate security concerns of all parties. We continue efforts to thwart and roll back both Iran’s development of NBC weapons and long-range missiles, and also Iraq’s efforts to reconstitute its NBC programs. In South Asia, we seek to persuade India and Pakistan to refrain from weaponizing or deploying nuclear weapons, testing or deploying missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and further producing fissile material for nuclear weapons. We also urge India and Pakistan to adhere fully to international nonproliferation standards and to sign and ratify the CTBT.

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