National Security Strategy 2001

 

The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remains a cornerstone of strategic stability, and the United States is committed to continue efforts to enhance the Treaty’s viability and effectiveness. On September 26, 1997, representatives of the United States, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine signed or initialed five agreements relating to the ABM Treaty. At the Cologne G-8 Summit in June 1999, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin reiterated their determination to achieve earliest possible ratification and entry into force of those agreements. The two presidents also reaffirmed at Cologne their existing obligations under Article XIII of the ABM Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the ABM Treaty and, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. They also agreed to begin discussions on the ABM Treaty in parallel with discussions on START Ill. The United States has proposed that the ABM Treaty be modified to accommodate possible deployment of a limited National Missile Defense (NMD) system that would counter new threats by states that threaten international peace and security while preserving strategic stability.
At the June 4, 2000, Moscow summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement of Principles on Strategic Stability. The Principles state that the international community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies, and that there is a need to address these threats. The Principles recalled the existing provisions of the ABM Treaty, to consider changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the provisions of the treaty, and, as appropriate, to consider possible proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. The Principles also record agreement to intensify discussions on both ABM issues and START III.
The United States has also made clear to Russia that we are prepared to engage in serious cooperation to address the emerging ballistic missile threat, and we have identified a number of specific ideas for discussion. At the same June 4, 2000, Moscow Summit, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed an agreement to establish a Joint Center for exchanging early warning data on ballistic missile launches. The agreement will significantly reduce the danger that ballistic missiles could be launched inadvertently on false warning of attack. It will also promote increased mutual confidence in the capabilities of the ballistic missile early warning systems of both sides. The Presidents also agreed to explore more far-reaching cooperation to address missile threats.
On July 21, 2000, in Okinawa, Presidents Clinton and Putin issued a Joint Statement on Cooperation on Strategic Stability, which identifies specific areas and projects for cooperation to control the spread of missiles, missile technology, and weapons of mass destruction. On September 6, 2000, in New York, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement on the Strategic Stability Cooperation Initiative and Implementation Plan, which provides further detail and an agreed timetable for pursuing cooperation in these areas, including the establishment of a ballistic missile and space launch vehicle pre-launch notification regime in which other states would be invited to participate. Most recently, the United States and Russia signed a bilateral pre-launch notification agreement on December 16, 2000.
To be secure, we must not only have a strong military; we must also take the lead in building a safer, more responsible world. We have a fundamental responsibility to limit the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. To this end, the United States remains committed to bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into force.
To date, 160 countries have signed — and 68 have ratified — the Treaty prohibiting all nuclear explosions. The 68 include 31 of the 44 countries named in the Treaty whose ratification is necessary for entry into force. The CTBT will, in effect, constrain nuclear weapons development. The United States ended nuclear testing eight years ago; upon entry into force, the CTBT will require other state entities to also refrain from testing. We are confident in the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile, and we are confident that a fully supported and sustained stockpile stewardship program will enable us to continue to maintain America’s nuclear deterrent capability. However, if we find we cannot, we would have the option of using our supreme national interest withdrawal rights under the Treaty in order to conduct whatever nuclear testing is necessary.
The CTBT will put in place a worldwide network of sensors for detecting nuclear explosions. With over 300 stations around the globe — including 31 in Russia, 11 in China, and 17 in the Middle East — this international monitoring system will improve our ability to monitor nuclear explosions and catch cheaters. The United States already has dozens of monitoring stations of its own; the CTBT will allow us to take advantage of other countries’ stations, while also creating new ones. The Treaty also will give us the right to request on-site inspections of sites in other countries where nuclear tests are suspected to have taken place.
As a matter of policy, the United States will maintain its moratorium on nuclear testing, pending entry into force of the CTBT, and we are encouraging all other states to do the same. We are also encouraging all states that have not signed and ratified the CTBT to do so. Despite the unfortunate rejection of the CTBT by the U.S. Senate, we remain committed to obtaining Senate advice and consent for ratification of this treaty. United States ratification will encourage other states to ratify, enable the United States to lead the international effort to gain CTBT entry into force, and strengthen international norms against nuclear testing. Simply stated, the United States must be prepared to lead by example.
The NPT, the cornerstone of international nuclear nonproliferation regime, reinforces regional and global security by creating and sustaining confidence in the non-nuclear commitments of its parties. It was an indispensable precondition for the denuclearization of Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Belarus and South Africa. We seek to ensure that the NPT remains a strong and vital element of global security by achieving universal adherence and full compliance by its parties with their Treaty obligations. A Review Conference held in May 2000, the first in fifteen years with a consensus document, strengthened the global nuclear nonproliferation norm and demonstrated that support for this critical Treaty is broad and deep. We won our case by vigorously promoting the value of the NPT in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons while continuing policies designed to reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons and to work for their ultimate elimination.
The safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an essential component of the nuclear nonproliferation regime. We seek widespread adoption of the IAEA’s strengthened safeguards system and to ensure that the IAEA has the resources necessary to fulfill its obligations. We are working to amend the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material to ensure that its standards cover national activities as well as international transfers of nuclear material, which complements our effort to enhance IAEA safeguards. We also seek the immediate commencement of negotiations to achieve a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. Halting production of fissile materials for nuclear explosions would cap the supply of nuclear materials available worldwide for weapons, a key step in halting the spread of nuclear weapons. A coordinated effort by the intelligence community and law enforcement agencies to detect, prevent, and deter illegal trafficking in fissile materials is essential to our counterproliferation efforts. So is the Material Protection, Control and Accounting program, which enhances security for former Soviet nuclear materials and helps prevent them from ending up in the hands of terrorists or proliferant states. We also recognize that nuclear weapon free zone treaties and protocols that conform with long-standing U.S. criteria can also advance nuclear nonproliferation goals.

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